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Physician Profiling:
Can Medicare Paint an
Accurate Picture?
Laura A. Dummit, Principal Policy Analyst
Overview — Physician profiling, that is, the comparison of the health
care services used by a physician’s patients to average service use or another benchmark, has been proposed as a way to improve Medicare. It has
been used by private health plans and physician groups to identify both
efficient practice patterns and the physicians who practice efficiently. The
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have recommended that Medicare
adopt physician profiling to slow spending growth and improve efficiency.
Recent legislation would mandate that Medicare employ profiling. This
issue brief reviews MedPAC and GAO’s analyses of profiling, concerns
about using this type of information, and the obstacles in incorporating
profiling in the Medicare program.
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Physician Profiling:
Can Medicare Paint an
Accurate Picture?
Comparisons of physician practice styles often point out variations in
prescribing and treatment regimens that translate into large cost differences in caring for apparently similar patients. Profiling is a methodology
for compiling data on the health care services received by a physician’s
patients to compare an individual physician’s practice with a standard or
norm. This methodology has been used to identify physicians who have
higher or lower than expected resource use given the identified needs of
their patients. This information can then be used to inform efforts to steer
patients to lower cost physicians. Profiling has also been used to encourage high resource-use physicians to adopt practice styles of their lower
resource-use colleagues.
Profiling has captured the attention of federal health policymakers in
their pursuit of ways to improve the quality of care provided to Medicare
beneficiaries while slowing the unrelenting growth in spending. Recent
proposed legislation, the Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act
(H.R. 3162), would require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
“develop and implement a mechanism to measure resource use on a per
capita and an episode basis in order to provide confidential feedback to
physicians in the Medicare program on how their practice patterns compare
to physicians generally, both in the same locality as well as nationally.”1
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) also has indicated
that it will report on providing feedback to physicians with profiling data
in the fall of 2007.2
The interest among Congress and the executive branch in the use of profiling in the Medicare program raises many questions.3 What is the objective
of the profiling effort, and what would indicate its success? What measures
of resource use would be compiled? How would the standard or norm be
established? Would it be a national or local standard? How would patient
resource use be assigned to a particular physician? How would the data
account for differences in the mix of patients treated by physicians and
the differences in severity even across patients with the same conditions?
What type of information would be fed back to physicians? How would
physicians who do not treat many Medicare patients be assessed? How
would physicians be expected to respond to this information? These and
many more philosophical and technical questions need to be addressed
in designing a profiling program for Medicare.
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Profiling to Alter Patient Choice of
Provider or Physician Practice Patterns
Some private health plans have tried to rein in the often large differences in
practice patterns across physicians to hold down spending, either by influencing patient choice of provider or by affecting physicians’ resource use.
One approach has been to give patients financial incentives through reduced
co-payments to choose lower cost physicians. Their choice of physician may
also be influenced by public reports of provider quality and efficiency measures that health plans make available. Public reports as well as confidential
feedback have also been used by health plans to influence physician resource
use by highlighting lower cost practice styles and the resource use of other
physicians for similar patients. This feedback may be reinforced through
financial incentives. For example, in health plan networks, lower resourceuse physicians have been given preferred status, higher fees, or differential
salaries or bonuses based on efficiency measures.
Physician groups have used profiling as
The GIC effort has demonstrated that it is feapart of their internal clinical and quality
management efforts. Profiling efforts sible to aggregate claims across plans to develop
have provided the information to control the data for profiling and that a large health care
or reduce spending on a patient popu- purchaser can require the use of profiling.
lation, which can help them achieve a
favorable position with payers or increase their margins from capitated
contracts. Information about practice styles has been used to educate their
physician members about more efficient or effective methods of care or
patterns of service use. Comparisons of a physician’s practice style to his
or her peers have also been used to distribute group income or to reward
more efficient providers. A physician group that can demonstrate its efficiency relative to other groups in an area may have an edge in negotiating favorable terms and fees with payers. They may also profit more from
capitated contracts than less efficient groups.
To facilitate the adoption of profiling, the Massachusetts Group Insurance
Commission (GIC), the public agency that provides insurance to the state’s
employees, retirees, and dependents, has begun a multi-year effort to develop physician-specific quality and efficiency data.4 It has aggregated the
claims data from all of the health plans that it contracts with. The health
plans under contract to the GIC are required to use these data to develop
tiered physician and hospital networks. A tiered network typically includes
designated preferred providers; other providers may be non-preferred or
even excluded from coverage in the health plan. The tiers associate lower
patient co-payments with more efficient providers. The intention of the
GIC is to have plans help patients become better consumers and encourage
physicians to become more efficient. Although it is too soon to document
any results, this effort has demonstrated that it is feasible to aggregate
claims across plans to develop the data for profiling and that a large health
care purchaser can require the use of profiling.
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THE DESIGN WILL AFFECT THE RESULTS
The methods to identify efficient providers vary and the definitions of key
concepts differ, which complicates the development of successful profiling
efforts. Profiling requires aggregating health care claims data by patient and
then associating patients with the physicians who care for them. The data for
each physician are compiled so that the resource use profile of an individual
physician’s patients can be compared with a standard. The standard may be
the average resource use of all physicians in a group or a benchmark.
The design of the profiling effort is likely to affect the results, that is, which
physicians are identified as having efficient or inefficient practice patterns.
Critical design questions include which services to include and how to assign patients to a physician. For example, should only physician-provided
services be counted or should all services be included, such as hospitalizations and pharmaceuticals? While the physician may directly control the
number of follow-up office visits for a patient, an individual physician has
much less control over the resources used during a hospital stay. During
a course of treatment or over a period of time, a patient is likely to see
several physicians.5 A profiling strategy may assign all claims for a patient
to a primary care physician responsible for the majority of office visits to
that patient. Alternative strategies may assign to a physician only those
services that were provided or ordered directly by that doctor.
The manner of grouping claims, either over a period of time or for an
episode of care related to a particular condition, may also influence the
results or how the profiling information may be used. Aggregating claims
for a patient over a period of time, called a per-capita approach, allows
comparisons when data are limited and describes differences in per-person
health care spending across geographic regions or populations. With a percapita approach, the results are relatively easy to understand, most claims
can be assigned to a physician, and analyses can identify areas or issues
that may require further elucidation. The results, however, generally do
not include information that is specific enough for individual physicians
to identify practices that, if changed, could make them more efficient.
Profiling based on episodes of care produces information that may be more
“actionable” for an individual physician. A patient’s claims for services related to a particular condition are aggregated, and then the patient episode
is assigned to a physician. For example, all services for a patient related to
the treatment of diabetes and its complications would be grouped. The episodes for a physician would be aggregated so that the physician’s treatment
of patients with diabetes could be compared with the treatment of similar
patients of other physicians. This method is likely to yield more information
on the factors contributing to differences in physician efficiency. It can help
tease out whether one physician’s patients receive more diagnostic services
or more expensive pharmaceuticals than the benchmark, for example. This
is information that can be used by a physician to determine the behaviors
that could be changed to bring the profile in line with the benchmark.
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Per-capita and episode profiling approaches yield particularly useful information when used together. This is illustrated by the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MedPAC) in an analysis of seemingly contradictory
findings.6 MedPAC’s per-capita analysis identified Miami as a high resourceuse area and Minneapolis as a low resource-use
area. Yet its analysis of coronary artery disease Accounting for differences in the mix and
episodes in the two locations revealed that the
complexity of a physician’s patients, someaverage costs for an episode of care for coronary
artery disease was $2,691 in Miami compared times called risk adjustment, is an imporwith $3,507 in Minneapolis. The episode analy- tant and difficult aspect of profiling.
sis indicated a more expensive pattern of care
in Minneapolis, with a higher hospitalization rate and more treatmentoriented services, which are costlier than the diagnostic services that were
more prevalent in the Miami episodes. Even with lower episode costs, the
Miami physicians had higher per capita spending, however, because they
were more likely to identify patients as having coronary artery disease.
That is, there were more episodes. In Miami, patients with coronary artery
disease had an average of almost three episodes, compared with about two
in Minneapolis. This indicates that physicians in Minneapolis focused their
more intensive style on patients who were more likely to need treatment
for coronary artery disease.

Accounting for Patient Differences
Differences in patient resource use are often dismissed with statements such
as “my patients are sicker” or “I provide higher quality care.” Clearly, some
patients do need more medical services than others and some physicians do
treat more complex patients. Without adequate adjustments for the complexity or health care needs of a physician’s patients, physicians with sicker
patients would appear to be less efficient than others, and physicians with
fewer complex patients would seem more efficient. This could compromise
access to care for needier patients if physicians selected less complex patients
to help ensure that their profile showed high relative efficiency.
Accounting for differences in the mix and complexity of a physician’s
patients, sometimes called risk adjustment, is an important and difficult
aspect of profiling. Although risk adjustment techniques have improved
significantly in recent years, they may not be fully adequate and are often
the subject of controversy. For instance, it is likely that a patient with a
prior history of heart problems requires more resources to treat than one
without this history, but how much more? Someone who has not followed
a prescribed medical regimen may incur higher expenses than a more
compliant patient, but is noncompliance a factor that the physician should
be responsible for changing, or is it out of the physician’s control?
Similarly, profiling information needs to account for differences in patient
outcomes. A lower resource-use profile may not be desirable if it results in inadequate care. Providing less therapy after a joint replacement, for example,
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could reduce the costs for an episode of care. This would not necessarily
reflect a more efficient delivery pattern, however, unless patient outcomes
were the same for those who received less therapy. A comparison without
accounting for outcomes could falsely appear more efficient.

Acceptance of Profiling
The accuracy of the data used to construct physician profiles will affect
the results and the success of profiling efforts. A report on physician
profiling indicated that “information perceived as inaccurate by physicians will not motivate them to seek cost and quality improvements in
their practice patterns.”7 Most profiling efforts rely exclusively on billing
data or claims, which would include the services provided and possibly
diagnostic information, as well as date of service and the demographic
information needed to link claims by patient and provider. Some have
argued that without more detailed clinical or demographic information,
risk adjustment would not be adequate. Another critical issue is whether
there is an adequate number of patients or episodes to accurately describe
a physician’s practice. Various efforts are underway to define adequate
sample sizes and to ensure the accuracy of data. Concerns remain, however,
that a physician’s profile could be distorted by an aberrant case.
Acceptance of profiling by physicians will also depend on how profiling
is to be used. Physicians may find private feedback—when a physician
receives a report comparing that physician’s results and those of a reference
group—to be the most acceptable use of profiling. Profiling techniques that
involve the public release of results or that incorporate financial incentives
may be quite a different matter. Plans may report profiling data to influence patients or other providers to choose the most efficient physicians.
Plans may receive the strongest objections to profiling when financial
incentives are involved, particularly from any physician who received
less-than-optimal results. In the St. Louis area, for example, the largest
local hospital system and the state medical society helped stop an effort
by a large insurer to tier physicians in that region.8 A similar effort in New
York is being challenged by the state attorney general because of concerns
about the adequacy of the data and potential conflict of interest due to the
health plan’s interest in steering patients to the lowest cost providers.9

Physician Profiling with Medicare Data
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) demonstrated that Medicare claims data can be used to compare efficiency across physicians.10
GAO indicated that the comparative physician information developed
through profiling holds promise in slowing spending growth. In each of
the 12 metropolitan areas GAO studied, there were generalist physicians
who had overly expensive or inefficient practice styles in treating their
Medicare patients, and some areas had much higher shares of inefficient
physicians than others.11 (See Figure 1, next page, for a comparison of two
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Figure 1
Percentage
of Physicians

Physicians with Overly Expensive
Practice Styles in Miami and Albuquerque
The proportion of overly expensive patients — those with costs in the
top 20th percentile of the cost distribution of similar patients — varied
significantly across the areas examined by GAO. For example, in Miami,
28 percent of the study patients were overly expensive, compared to
13 percent of the patients in Albuquerque.

< Albuquerque
Physicians with overly expensive practice
styles had more overly expensive patients
than expected.
< Miami

In Albuquerque, 2 percent of physicians

had overly expensive practice styles.

In Miami, 20.9 percent of physicians had

overly expensive practice styles.

Proportion of Overly Expensive Patients in a Physician’s Practice

of the areas studied.) Inefficient physicians were defined as physicians
whose patients had extremely high resource use relative to their peers’
patients. GAO found that patients treated by inefficient physicians were
“15 percent more likely to have been hospitalized, 57 percent more likely
to have been hospitalized multiple times, and 51 percent more likely to
have used home health services” than similar patients seen by other physicians. They were also “10 percent less likely to have been admitted to a
skilled nursing facility.”12

Source: Adapted from GAO, “Medicare: Focus
on Physician Practice Patterns Can Lead to
Greater Program Efficiency,” GAO-07-307,
April 2007; available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d07307.pdf.

MedPAC has conducted extensive analyses of profiling and the software
used in determining episodes of care.13 MedPAC’s report on alternative
mechanisms for controlling Medicare physician expenditures included
an analysis of the use of profiling to identify physician outliers.14 They
noted that fewer than 2 percent of physicians accounted for 7.5 percent of
Medicare’s total physician payments for 2005. To conduct their analysis,
MedPAC aggregated claims data across episodes of care to show how
physician service use could be compared across patients with the same
condition. As an example, they compared the costs and services of patients
with stage 1 hypertension of one Boston cardiologist with the average cost
and service use of similar patients of all Boston cardiologists. The analysis
revealed that the selected cardiologist’s cost of care was $623, compared
to the average of $357, in part due to providing 14 office visits compared
with the average of 11 visits for other cardiologists in the area.
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CMS is pursuing physician profiling as a strategy for the Medicare program. In recent testimony before Congress, Acting Deputy Administrator
Herb Kuhn said, “We are investigating ways to measure individual physician resource use that links quality in the provision of care to Medicare
beneficiaries and encourages physicians to focus on efficiency. A goal of
resource use measurement is to provide information that is meaningful,
actionable, and fair to physicians in order to reduce inefficient practice patterns.”15 In comments on the GAO report, CMS Acting Administrator Leslie
Norwalk wrote, “…given the role of physicians in driving total Medicare
spending, there is opportunity to increase the efficiency of the Medicare
program by measuring and reporting on physician resource use.”16

Issues With Profiling
in the Medicare Program
It would be possible for Medicare to distribute information on an individual
physician’s practice patterns in comparison to others, much as CMS provides data on quality indicators for individual hospitals, skilled nursing
facilities, dialysis facilities, and home health agencies. The measurement
of physician efficiency and the methodological and risk adjustment issues
it entails, however, are much more complex. These methodological issues
would require difficult decisions about which claims data to aggregate,
careful risk adjustment to ensure the accuracy of comparisons, and an
understanding of clinical complexity and variation in practice. The generally smaller sample sizes of individual physician practices and lack of
consensus of appropriate practice patterns complicate these efforts.
One approach that has been considered is to use profiling to refine
Medicare’s sustainable growth rate (SGR), Medicare’s method for updating physician fees. Medicare’s SGR has been called a blunt instrument
that fails to distinguish between fees paid to frugal physicians and fees
to profligate ones. Physician profiles could be used to refine fee updates,
with lower updates to “outlier” physicians who have high utilization
profiles or physicians who have higher growth in resource use. As indicated by MedPAC, “The major advantage of measuring individual
physician resource use is that it addresses the flaw in the SGR of treating
all physicians equally. An outlier policy promotes individual physician
accountability and will enable physicians to more readily see a link between their actions and their payment.”17
The wide geographic variation in practice styles means that defining the
standard for comparison or the definition of an outlier physician would
be especially difficult. Should national standards or local standards be
incorporated into a Medicare profiling effort? A national standard would
require physicians in higher use areas, such as Miami, to change more
than physicians in lower use areas, such as Albuquerque. Local standards
would reduce any disruption in service use or practice, but would also
lessen any impact of the use of profiling.
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Incorporating financial incentives would raise the stakes and introduce
additional concerns to using physician profiling in Medicare. Changing Medicare so that it could tie financial incentives to the efficiency of
care would also be a fundamental shift in how the program interacts
with providers. Because Medicare is such a large, public payer, it exerts
more influence over the health care market than any other payer. Thus,
any actions that incorporate financial incentives could have substantial
effects on the financial viability of a physician practice, particularly a
small or Medicare-dependent practice. This could raise concerns about
Medicare’s special responsibility to maintain access. Because its 42 million
beneficiaries are throughout the country and
are likely to be more vulnerable than other Changing Medicare to tie financial incentives
insured populations, Medicare needs to ensure to the efficiency of care would be a fundathat enough providers are available and that mental shift in how the program interacts
their geographic distribution meets the needs
with providers.
of its beneficiaries.
Medicare also has a special responsibility to ensure freedom of choice for
its beneficiaries. The Medicare fee-for-service program was originally based
on the tenet that it would not interfere with the practice of medicine and
that beneficiaries could maintain their choice of provider. Using profiling
to give patients financial incentives to choose one physician over another
could be perceived as limiting freedom of choice. Incorporating profiling
in such a way that some providers could not or would not continue to
participate in Medicare could also be viewed limiting a physician’s ability to participate in the public program. Although provider participation
is not guaranteed, exclusion in this way would be a major change to the
Medicare program.

Potential Financial Impact
There is little evidence on whether profiling achieves savings, but there are
indications that private payers believe that profiling has been financially
worthwhile. GAO reported that one purchaser it interviewed said that the
premium for its plan that had a network that included only the most efficient
physicians was 3 to 7 percent lower than the premiums for its plans that
included all physicians. In another example, GAO reported that spending
growth fell for a purchaser that restructured its plan’s network. The Greater
Rochester Independent Practice Association (GRIPA) reported a drop in
emergency department visits and cost growth below the community trend
after they began providing feedback to their physicians about how their
individual practices compared to the average GRIPA physician.18
Whether profiling would achieve savings or slow spending growth in
Medicare is not known. The design features of CMS’s planned efforts or
the provision in H.R. 3162 have not been specified. The Congressional
Budget Office, which is responsible for determining the budget effects of all
legislation, did not attribute any savings to the profiling provision in H.R.
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3162.19 Nevertheless, either of these efforts—CMS’s efforts or the provisions
in H.R. 3162—might lay the groundwork, particularly with respect to data
collection and aggregation, needed for a successful profiling effort.

Conclusion
CMS is moving forward with plans to engage in profiling, although the
specifics of the initiative have not been released. The initial stage, however,
is likely to involve providing private feedback to physicians. Even this
step will require significant effort. Private payers and provider groups
have attested to the difficulties inherent in compiling the data, ensuring
its accuracy, appropriately adjusting the efficiency profiles, and enlisting
physician acceptance of the results.
While few would disagree with the notion that providers should be efficient in the delivery of health care services, few would agree on what
services should be cut out to improve efficiency. Unless a profiling effort adequately accounts for differences across patients and outcomes,
it would be criticized as inappropriately targeting particular physicians
or high cost patients. Unless the data were shown to accurately reflect a
physician’s practice pattern, they would be discredited as unfair. Each of
these methodological issues alone is a high hurdle. Given the Medicare
program’s ongoing struggles to rein in spending growth and the evidence
on inefficient practice, however, efforts to scale these hurdles may reap
benefits in the long run. Medicare’s involvement will be an important
catalyst for refined data tools and methods that could benefit everyone in
the health care arena.
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